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vlndlcated his Idea that, "war is polit/s w/ch blood and pohtics IS war without blood. '* In Great Bntaln, Sir Dangle Foot, the Solicitor General in the British Government responded by giving an Implied approval for the Africans' resort to armed struggle when his response to UDI was, that the African population had been denled all human rights and all means of political expression? Thus, the stage was now set for the next round of the polItical game. This time, It was polltics with blood.
What was not clear to the political and military leaders of the llberatlon movements at the time of starting the guerrilla campaign was the nature of war that was to be waged in pursuance of the political obJectwe-black majority rule.
Indeed, the nationalist leaders assumed that stepping up acts of sabotage and Isolated attacks on police posts and remote white farms would put enough pressure on both the British government and the Smith regime to result In serious pursuit of a peaceful settlement that would address the core issues at stake.
These lnltlal acts of sabotage only served to harden white attitudes and failed to produce the decisive action from either the British Government or the Smith regime. The "short war illusion," that was apparent among the guerrilla leadership and their cadres, led to their initial failure to fully appreciate the true nature of revolutionary warfare. This view IS further corroborated bv J.K. Callers' observation, that the Insurgents' strategy during the early phases of the struggle was based on two false assumptions. First was the belief that Britain could be There are tsx o schools of thought that ha\ e been advanced to explam the lull of actlvmes by Z-0-L-4 the nuhtary u mg of Z.4W Dumlso Dabengwa argues that Z-4SL.4 did not have enough recruns at this stage of the armed struggle hence it resorted to extensor e recruitment durmg the penod m questlon Josiah Tungarmral on the other hand argues convmcmgly that the disastrous defeats suffered on the battlefield necessitated a serious rewexx of the entire strategy and tactics bemg emplo) ed resultmg m the adoption of Maout docrrme and tactics For a detalled account on this debate see, 9 For a detailed account on the pre-UDI hostAnes see Wllkms op czt , ppS-6 6 Ibrd p 15 a re-appraisal of natronalist tactics and strategy, which showed a careful polItIcal preparation of the local population and adoption of classic guerrilla 'hit-and-run' attacks by small locally-based groups."
As will be shown In subsequent paragraphs, it IS not the superiority in mllltary hardware that determines the outcome of war. Three major factors contributed to the outcome of this conflrct, as we now know it. First, was the tvpe of ObJechVe that the nationalists set themselves to achieve-simply black maJonty rule. Second, was the qualitative change that was realized by the adoptron of Maoist doctrine and strategy by the freedom fighters and its successful rmplementatron, Third, was the Rhodesran forces' failure to comprehend the true nature of the war they were engaged In.
After having made some serious tactical mistakes during the early years of the struggle, the nationalist leadership made a rational assessment of their mrlltary situation. They made an equally pragmatic assessment of the regional and International environment and embarked on a realrstlc strategy aimed at bringing the Rhodesian economy to a stand still and shattering the whites' will to resist?
Political and Militarv Obiectives
The stated political ObjeCtive for the war of llberatlon was the attainment of black malonty rule In an Independent, multrracral Zimbabwe, leading to equitable distribution of wealth among Its population. This meant the removal of white polItIcal dominance, lntroductron of universal suffrage and subsequent black economic empowerment. At the core of the conflict was the problem of land redistribution. This was both a social and economic cause that was emotionally lo Cilliers Op Ctt pp 13-74 I1 Gann p 105 appealing to the black peasant farmers whose land had been confiscated by European settlers during the early decades of colonization. The importance of these obJectives to the suffering black maJority would determine their degree of commitment In the prosecution of the war. It can also be argued that the genuine plight of the Africans, and the simpl&y of our stated political objective, won the combatants a lot of sympathizers from most peace loving natlons.12 Herbert Chitepo13 outlined the militate objective as follows:
The strategic aim. . . is to attenuate the enemy forces by causing their deployment over the whole county. The subsequent mobii..zat/on of a large number of c/vllians from industry, business, and agriculture would have a psycbo~og~caally devastating effect on the morale of the Whites, most of whom bad come to Zjmbabwe, lured by the prospect of the easy, privtfeged life promised by the regime.14 Since war IS about a clash of opposing wills, the nationalists' strategy was geared towards weakening the resolve of the adversary to continue with the military campaign, as his economic and manpower base was seriously shaken. By 1973, the short war Illusion had disappeared. Cadres were mentally prepared for a long protracted struggle In which a combination of mllltary effort and diplomatic pressure would be brought to bare on the Smith regime to compliment the effects of UN economic sanctions.
" The trx o hberatron mox ements received enormous support from YGOs, I!! Agencies, and groups of mdwtduals who donated aid to alleviate the plight of the refugees 111 neighboring countnes Since the guertlla movements controlled the refugee camps, tt was me\ ttable that such donatrons ix ere shared among the freedom fighters and the potential recrmts langmshmg m refugee camps Aid came m the form of food, clothes, medrcme, shelter, vehicles etc The period 1968-1972 was our "strategic defense." The emphasis had been on polItIcal moblllzatlon of the rural peasants, before the launch of limited, defensive guenlla operations aimed pnmarlly at the protection of the guenlla units and their bases. Pitched battles and positional warfare were avoided, as the guerllla units had to survive by adopting asymmetrical responses to the Rhodesian forces' tactical initiatives. Prime Minister Ian Smith later acknowledged that the guerrillas remained undetected for a considerable length of time: "They were able to move backwards and forwards across the border from their so-called base camps and were thereby able to avoid detect/on for long enough to enable 26 It 1s nnportant to point out that the hberatlon struggle had a significant number of wha sympathizers fi-om all walks of life Particularly the nusslonarles runnmg mission school and hospitals did render the armed them to subvett pockets of local tribesmen. Thereafer their task was made easy through shelter, food, clothing and provided by the local populatlon':27
Pnonty targets for the guerrillas were Isolated police and military outposts, economic Installations, commercial centers and lines of communlcatlons.
Hospitals were mobilized for medical supplies to treat both the combatants and the rural population. The overall military strategy was to wear down the enemy's capacity to continue waging war through a protracted guenlla campaign. In short, this was a strategy of attrition. The country was to be made ungovernable, tribesmen to protected villages we are saving their lives. I don2 think we can be expecfed to do more than help them to help themselves." He added: " . but we are not going to feed these people. They must grow their own crops. Those who have had to leave permanent buld/ngs or propew will be able to move back when the terrorist threat is over." Such policies only served to further alienate the security forces and the government from the rural people.
It would appear that the Rhodesian military had a more realistic perspective about the Rhodesian conflict situation. For example, whereas the cIvilIan leadership, Internal Affairs Department and the Police-believed that unrest could be suppressed, some experts claim that the military realized that there was'a need for a political solution but never got permission for a full scale Malayslanstyle 'hearts and minds' campalgn.31 Protected Villages surrounded by guerrilla dominated countryside could never have produced the same effectiveness as
Malaysian style transfers of population; Rhodesian 'psychological warfare' was half-hearted and ineffective.32
One major problem confronting Security Forces and other ministries involved In the execution of this strategy was lack of funds. Although various efforts were launched to develop protected villages as growth points, manpower, finance, polItIcal constraints, and lack of imagination led to their early demise. Thus, the planning document Issued by the Department of Internal Affairs, concluded that the short-term ObJectlVe was the removal of the African people from terronst
Influence for the sake of national security33 The long term remained on the drawing board, to the detriment of the whole security forces' strategy and to the advantage of the freedom fighters.
31 Quoted m Bhebe and Ranger op Ca , p 15 3' Ibld 33 The balance of available e\ldence rather suggests the execution of the strategy of Protected Villages suffered two major shortcommgs First there was an over-emphans on the short term goal of phyacallq concentratmg the local population and the freedom of acnon this would gwe the Security Forces In the second place there was a lack of sustamed effort m the allocanon of resources to the development of Protected Villages and the mcrease of the general standard of hrmg m them In those areas such as Madzlw a and Chweshe Tribal Trust Lands were such a sustained effort had occurred the results xx ere correspondmglp better than elsen here As more and more protected villages were constructed, less and less manpower was made available to monitor the movement of the people and provide adequate security for the villages. The guerrillas came and liberated these protected villages, further forestalling and r?verslng efforts by security forces.
Indeed, the Introduction of protected villages was a self-defeating strategy on the part of the Rhodesian war machinery.
As the liberation movement gained momentum and better public&y, the black population was moving in greater numbers into neighboring countries. To curb this, the Rhodesian forces adopted the strategy of cordon sankare Unfortunately, the Rhodeslans did not have adequate financial resources to put a up formidable cordon sanitaire--like the one along the Israeli border with Lebanon and Syria, or the dividing lines between East and West Germany. Given
Rhodeslans' limited resources, the concept was a failure, as movement of Insurgents across the borders remained unimpeded. The whole system could not meet the stringent requirements for an effective border control system, namely the provision of an effective and timely detection capabIlIty, ability to delay the enemy and effectiveness In neutralizing the insurgents.
Further frustrated by the escalation of war inside Rhodesia and by the Increasing rate of casualties, the Rhodesian forces resorted to cross-broader strategic bombing and external operations. External operations were designed to disrupt command and control of the guerrilla forces, and disrupt loglstlc supplies and training programs In rear bases. At the strategic level, one can argue that they were meant to buv time for a political settlement, or they were aimed at overthrowing the existing host government to destroy that country's support for the liberation war. In the absence of a sound political strategy and with increasing sensitivity to white casualties the second option remained open throughout the latter part of the struggle.
With a total pol:ulatlon of 270 000 whites out of 6 million blacks, white casualtles had a dlsproportlonately large effect. One expert analyst described the effects of white casualties on the white community as follows, "an /ndiwdua/ death, hke a pebble dropped in water might make a brief hole; yet rings of sorrow widen out there from. We could not afford casualties. Id4
One additional fundamental mistake that the Smith regime made was its failure Important lessons can be drawn from this analvsls.
First, IS the importance of knowing the nature of war one IS engaged In. This applies both to the political leadership and the mllltary commanders charged with the responslblllty of waging the war to achieve the desired political ends. 
